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 Executive Summary 
 
  In January 2007, President Bush issued an Executive Order changing the 
procedures for undertaking benefit-cost analyses of proposed regulations.  These changes 
have been hailed by some as dramatic improvements while criticized by others as 
representing the politicization of the evaluation process.  This essay analyzes the major 
provisions of the new Executive Order, and concludes that it is unlikely to have much of 
an impact on the number or quality of regulations.  Only one provision – subjecting major 
“guidelines” documents to mandatory benefit-cost analysis – potentially could be 
important, but even here there is no systematic evidence that agencies have used guidance 
documents to change the stringency of regulations and thereby to bypass the mandatory 
regulatory review for regulations.  Moreover, the Executive Order leaves untouched the 
primary weaknesses of benefit-cost analysis as practiced by government agencies, such as 
the absence of standardization of values for key parameters, the use of inappropriate 
alternative regulations for comparison with a proposed regulation, and the general lack of 
either peer review or ex post re-evaluation of regulatory impact studies. 
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The Economic Significance of Executive Order 13422 
Roger G. Noll 
 
Executive Order (EO) 13422 is remarkably short, covering barely more than two pages and 
consisting primarily of a series of small wording changes and inserts into President Clinton’s EO 
12866 that established the current regime of mandatory benefit-cost analysis for regulations 
promulgated by executive branch agencies.  Despite its brevity, the new EO has been widely 
heralded by proponents and critics alike as the most significant change in the process of reviewing 
new regulations since EO 12866 was released in 1993.
1
The purpose of this essay is to assess the likely economic significance of the new EO.  
Before evaluating the desirability of the new EO, one must first determine what effects, if any, it is 
likely to have on regulatory outcomes.  My main conclusion is that both the accolades and the 
criticisms of EO 13422 are over-stated and based less on what the new EO says than on either one’s 
views about the desirability of benefit-cost analysis generally or one’s evaluation of the Bush 
Administration.  The only provision in the new EO that plausibly could have a substantial effect is 
the requirement to undertake an economic impact analysis of major guidance documents.  The other 
changes to EO 12866 are largely cosmetic and unlikely to have much of an impact on either the 
quality of regulatory review or the outputs of regulatory processes.  Moreover, EO 13422 does not 
address the main shortcomings of the OMB regulatory review process:  inconsistencies in the quality 
and underlying assumptions of different mandatory benefit-cost analyses among agencies and even 
among regulations in the same agency.  
 
The Main Provisions of EO 13422 
 
The changes introduced by EO 13422 fall into five categories.  (1) The Statement of 
Regulatory Principles (Section 1 of EO 12866) is amended to require regulators to state in writing 
                                                 
1.  “On January 18, 2007, President George W. Bush issued E. O. 13422, making the most significant amendments to E. 
O. 12866 since it was published.  The changes made by this new executive order are controversial, characterized as some 
as a power grab by the White House that undermines public protections and lessens congressional authority, and by 
others as a ‘paragon of common sense and good government.’” Curtis W. Copeland, “Changes to the OMB Regulatory 
Review Process by Executive Order 13422,” CRS Report for Congress RL33862, Congressional Research Service, 
February 5, 2007. 2 
 
 
the problem that a regulation is intended to address (rather than “identify” the problem), and in the 
statement of the types of problems that might give rise to a regulation to give greater prominence to 
the “market failure” rationale.  (2) Several amendments formally recognize the existence and 
legitimacy of “guidance documents,” and the new EO first defines “significant guidance documents” 
and then requires agencies to undertake a benefit-cost analysis of them.  (3) Section 4(c)(1)(B) of EO 
12866 requires that agencies submit an annual plan for the regulations that they anticipate adopting 
in the next fiscal year that includes “preliminary estimates” of the benefits and costs of each 
regulation.  EO 13422 amends this section to require that agencies also submit an estimate of the 
total benefits and costs of all of their anticipated regulations.  (4) Section 6(a)(2) is amended to 
require that an agency’s Regulatory Policy Officer be a political appointee, and Section 4(c)(1) is 
amended to give the Regulatory Policy Officer a principle role in creating the agency’s regulatory 
plan.  (5) The new EO states that agencies “in consultation with OIRA, may consider” using formal 
rule-making procedures “for the resolution of complex determinations.” 
 
Written Problem Identification 
 
The Statement of Regulatory Principles in EO 12866 applies to all regulations, not just 
“significant” regulations that require a benefit-cost analysis.  The new amendment contains an action 
item:  an agency must “identify in writing the specific market failure ... or other specific problem 
that it intends to address....”  In EO 12866, agencies only were required to identify the problem 
giving rise to the regulation, but not to state the nature of the problem in writing.  Under the EO 
12866 regime, it is hard to imagine how an agency could have failed to reveal the nature of the 
problem that led to a significant regulation requiring a benefit-cost analysis.  The statement of the 
benefits of the regulation in even a crude benefit-cost analysis must reveal the problem for which the 
proposed regulation is the solution.  Thus, the main effect of this new language is to require a written 
justification for all regulations, not just significant ones, and to assure prominence to the written 
statement of the problem for significant regulations. 
Because agencies are required only to identify a problem, not to measure it, the new 
provision does not appear to require much work but could add to transparency by identifying the 
purpose of a regulation.  Thus, the requirement to provide a written explanation seems to be a 3 
 
 
reasonable good governance measure.  Nevertheless, this requirement is not likely to have any 
impact on regulatory policy because it is not plausible that agencies are busily writing rules that 
agency officials believe address no problem.  Moreover, if the purpose of this change was to clarify 
the agency’s responsibilities, the new wording does not succeed, because it does not specify how the 
agency can satisfy the requirement for a written identification of the problem.  Presumably the 
purpose is to give policy review officials in the Office of Management and Budget, participants in 
the regulatory process, and citizens in general a clear, crisp statement of the purpose of a proposed 
regulation.  If so, the new requirement should have been that the agency must include a written 
statement of purpose in the preamble to a new regulation.  As it stands, the written statement could 
appear only in a private communication to a party who is neither involved in the regulatory 
proceeding nor a relevant government official. 
Some critics of EO 13422 focus on an inversion of wording in the recitation of problems that 
a regulation might address.  The old EO wording was: “identify the problem that it intends to 
address (including, where applicable, the failure of private markets...).”  According to these critics, 
the rearrangement of the list of problems puts added emphasis on market failures as a rationale for 
regulation.  I believe that this criticism is unjustified for four reasons. 
First, the language of the section still lists purposes other than market failures that can be 
used as justifications for a regulation.  The identification of a market failure as a source of the 
problem is not required.  The new EO does not eliminate or amend the list of benefits that may be 
achieved by a regulation.  This list still includes as potential benefits “economic, environmental, 
public health and safety; distributive impacts; and equity.” 
Second, the new EO adds a clear new Section 10 to EO 12866
 stating that:  “Nothing in this 
order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect the authority vested by law in an agency or the 
head thereof...”  This statement enables an agency to develop regulations in response to any purpose 
that is set forth in the agency’s statutory mandate.  Whereas this statement has no legal impact 
because an executive order cannot repeal or amend a statute, it does make clear that the amendments 
to the EO are not intended to create any friction with congressional mandates in regulatory statutes. 
Third, the “market failure” concept is extremely general.  In economics, the term “market 
failure” refers to any departure of a market outcome from a perfectly competitive equilibrium in 4 
 
 
which all consequences of a market transaction are fully taken into account.
2  Among these market 
failures are market power on behalf of either buyers or sellers, third-party effects such as 
environmental and public health externalities that neither buyers nor sellers take fully into account, 
gains from illegal activities such as crime and discrimination, and incomplete information on behalf 
of either buyers or sellers.  As revealed by the contents of textbooks in the field, benefit-cost 
analysis includes methods for taking into account most social policy concerns.
3  Thus, even if EO 
13422 elevates the role of the market-failure paradigm in regulatory policy analysis, which is 
doubtful, this change is likely to have little or no practical significance. 
Fourth, under EO 12866 as amended by EO 13422, agencies are not required to reject 
regulations that have negative net expected benefits.  Indeed, among advocates of benefit-cost 
analysis, the continuing promulgation and enforcement of significant regulations that have 
substantial negative net benefits constitutes that main failure of mandatory benefit-cost analysis as 
implemented by every administration for more than thirty years.  Given this reality, no 
rearrangement of items in the list of problems giving rise to regulations is likely to deliver a 




Guidance documents have been a problematic feature of regulation for a very long time.  
Guidance documents typically offer a clarification or interpretation of a regulation or at statute but 
are not themselves binding regulations.  Guidance documents become problematic when they advise 
a firm or citizen how to comply with a regulation.  As a hypothetical example, an agency might 
adopt a regulation that establishes a performance standard, and then issue a guidance document 
stating that a certain remedial action (an implicit technical input standard) will be presumed to 
satisfy the performance requirement.  Such a guidance document could be beneficial to regulated 
                                                 
2.  The classic reference is Francis M. Bator, “The Anatomy of a Market Failure,” Quarterly Journal of Economics Vol. 
72, No. 3 (August 1958), pp. 351-79. 
3.  For example, see Anthony Boardman, David Greenberg, Aidan Vining, and David Weimer, Cost Benefit Analysis (3
rd 
Edition), Prentice-Hall, 2005.  For example, this book contains chapters on distributional weights to take into account the 
effects of programs on income distribution and “contingent valuation” surveys to estimate the value of conserving natural 
resources and endangered species.  Another example is the use of the estimated increase in consumers’ surplus (price 
reduction times quantity sold) as a measure of the benefits of antitrust enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission 5 
 
 
parties because it allows them to avoid having to prove compliance with a performance standard;  
however, the regulated party still bears the burden of proof that a remedial measure that is not 
included in the document also satisfies the standard. 
The problem with using guidance documents in this fashion arises from the fact that it drives 
a procedural cost wedge between two remedial actions.  In principle, an agency could use a guidance 
document to force regulated entities to adopt measures that exceed the performance standard as long 
as the higher cost of these remedies is smaller than the cost of demonstrating that another, cheaper 
measure complies with the standard.  Using guidance documents in this manner is an example of 
“regulatory creep,”
4 i.e., increasing the stringency of a regulation without having to defend the new 
implicit standard in either a benefit-cost analysis or its rule-making process.
5  Likewise, an agency 
could use guidance documents to undercut its own performance regulations by stating that it regards 
a particular technical fix as sufficient for compliance even though this action does not satisfy the 
performance standard.  While either type of abusive use of guidance documents probably could be 
successfully challenged in court, a regulated firm or public interest advocacy group may not regard 
the costs of challenging a new regulation that is implicit in a guidance document because the 
expense of litigating the matter exceeds the potential benefit of a legal victory.  As a result, appeals 
to the courts might not be used against all such abuses of guidance documents. 
The new EO does two things.  First, it legitimizes the use of guidance documents by 
asserting that they can play a valuable role in making regulation more transparent and compliance 
easier.  Second, it requires a benefit-cost analysis for “significant” guidance documents, thereby 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Federal Trade Commission, Strategic Plan 2003-2008, September 2003, p. 15). 
4.  Regulatory creep refers to a gradual broadening and strengthening of regulation that is not based on either the 
underlying statutory law, court decisions or proper administrative processes.  See Clive Jones, “Regulatory Creep:  Myths 
and Misunderstandings,” Risk and Regulation No. 8 (Winter 2004), p. 6. 
5.  “The growing number of such guidance documents may be seen with some concern by the industry, as they may result 
in increasing development costs.  Indeed, there is some danger of requirements augmenting unnecessarily by ‘Regulatory 
Creep.’”  Helene I. Dumitriu, Good Drug Regulatory Practices:  A Regulatory Affairs Quality Manual, Informa Health 
Care, 1997, p. 11.  6 
 
 
making the requirements for regulations and guidance documents similar. 
A new section 3(g) defines a guidance document as “significant” if it has any of the 
following characteristics:  has an annual economic effect of $100 million or more;  has a material 
adverse effect on the economy, a sector of the economy, the environment, public health, or 
government;  contains a serious inconsistency with an action of another agency;  has a material 
effect on entitlements, grants, user fees or loan programs;  or raises novel legal or policy issues.  
These are the same characteristics that are listed in Section 3(f) of EO 12866 in the definition of a 
“significant regulatory action” that requires a benefit-cost analysis.  But EO 13422 excludes from the 
“significant” category guidance documents that arise from formal rule-making, pertain to military or 
foreign relations, deal with agency organization and management, or otherwise have been declared 
exempt by OIRA.  EO 12866 contains no such exclusions for regulations. 
In principle, the requirement to subject significant guidance documents to mandatory benefit-
cost analysis could be important.  The key issue is whether, despite their non-binding nature, some 
guidance documents establish de facto new rules that impose costs on society.  The evidence on this 
point consists of general statements of concern by some industry officials and some anecdotes.
6  I 
have not been able to locate any clear examples, let alone any systematic study, of the misuse of 
guidance documents by regulatory agencies.
7  The Bush Administration presented no such evidence 
when EO 13422 was issued.  Nevertheless, the definition of a “significant guidance document” does 
identify items that theoretically are equal in importance to “significant regulatory actions.”  If such 
documents exist, there is no good reason to treat them differently than regulations that have the same 
effect. 
In the end, one’s view about the new requirements for guidance documents is likely to 
depend on one’s views about mandatory benefit-cost analysis for binding regulations.  For 
                                                 
6.  For a list of about 45 examples of policy statements and guidance documents, mostly from the 1980s, that the author 
regards as improperly having been used as binding regulations, see Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive Rules, Policy 
Statements, Guidances, Manuals and the Like:  Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?”  Duke Law 
Journal Vol. 41, No. 6 (June 1992), pp. 1311-84.  The article focuses only on the procedural validity of such documents, 
not whether the documents had a substantial economic impact or were a reasonable, if procedurally flawed, attempt to 
clarify an existing regulation.  To my knowledge this article is the only systematic attempt to study the use of guidance 
documents. 
7.  The absence of empirical evidence has led Clive Jones to conclude that ‘regulatory creep” may be an “urban myth.”  
Jones, op. cit.  7 
 
 
proponents of benefit-cost analysis, extending the coverage of mandatory analysis to significant 
guidance documents as defined in EO 13422 is only logical.  If few significant guidance documents 
actually exist, the new provisions will generate little benefit but also will add little cost, as few 
guidance documents will be reviewed.  If a substantial number of guidance documents do have a 
significant impact, the case for subjecting them to mandatory benefit-cost analysis is identical to the 
argument in favor of EO 12866.  In this case, review of significant guidance documents may be 
costly, straining the resources of OIRA and regulatory agencies that already lack sufficient resources 
to undertake high-quality analyses of significant regulations.  Whether one believes that additional 
reviews are worth the cost turns on one’s views about the merits of mandatory benefit-cost analysis. 
 Because every President since Gerald Ford has required benefit-cost analysis in the process of 
promulgating major regulations, one should not be shocked to learn that another presidential 
advocate of benefit-cost analysis has extended the requirement to guidance documents that have an 
impact similar to that of significant regulations. 
 
Benefits and Costs of the Regulatory Plan 
 
The new EO requires that agencies estimate the total benefits and costs of all of the 
regulations that are contained in their annual regulatory plans.  A common criticism of this provision 
is that it represents a first step down the slippery slope to a regulatory budget
8 – that is, an annual 
cap on the total costs imposed by new regulations during a fiscal year.  The new EO is not the first 
step towards a regulatory budget – that first step was EO 12866, which required that agencies 
provide provisional estimates of expected benefits and costs for each anticipated regulation in their 
annual plan.  The new provision requires only that the estimates for each regulation be added to 
provide a total estimated impact of agency actions.  Because the estimated benefits and costs for 
each regulation are part of the plan, any numerate person could do the necessary addition. 
Notwithstanding the de minimus nature of the new requirement, a puzzle is why the Bush 
Administration even bothered to include this adding-up requirement.  Annual regulatory plans 
                                                 
8.  The regulatory budget was first proposed in William D. Nordhaus and Robert A. Litan, Reforming Federal 
Regulation, Yale University Press, 1983.  Nordhaus was a member of President Carter’s Council of Economic Advisers 
and Litan was deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget under President Clinton. 8 
 
 
neither bind agencies nor predict the regulations that agencies actually will adopt during the coming 
year.  The main reason is that one of the main jobs of regulatory agencies, especially in the health 
and safety field, is to respond to unanticipated problems as they arise.  Regulations that are 
responses to dramatic new information or emergencies cannot be predicted and so typically are not 
mentioned in regulatory plans for the year in which they are adopted. 
Even for regulations that have long gestation periods and so are reasonably accurately 
anticipated, the estimates of benefits and costs that are included in annual plans are not much more 
than educated guesses.  These estimates often are made before an agency knows the specific 
regulation that it will adopt, and before it has collect much information about the likely benefits and 
costs of the regulation it is considering. 
If a regulatory budget were adopted, its target would be to cap the cost of promulgated 
regulations. Thus it would apply to the regulations that are adopted in a fiscal year.  The difference 
between planned and promulgated regulations is similar to the difference between agency plans and 
actual appropriations for federal construction projects.  Public works agencies typically have a long 
list of planned and even congressionally authorized projects that, in a given fiscal year, lack 
appropriation and so are not undertaken.  The regulatory budget is about actual actions (parallel to 
appropriations), not plans. 
For all of these reasons, the provision about estimating the overall benefits and costs of 
planned regulations is not a significant change.  No matter what one’s view of the regulatory budget, 
the new EO does not bring it any closer to reality. 
 
The Regulatory Compliance Officer 
 
EO 13422 makes two changes regarding an agency’s Regulatory Policy Officer (RPO).  
These are better understood if considered in the reverse order in which they appear in the EO.  
Section 6(a)(2) is amended to require that the RPO be a presidential appointee, and to remove the 
statement that the RPO “shall report to the agency head.”  This provision is the source of the claim 
that EO 13422 is a “White House power grab.”  But this interpretation is somewhat vitiated by the 
changes to Section 4(c)(1).  In EO 12866, this section required that the annual regulatory plan “shall 
be approved personally by the agency head.”  The new wording is: “Unless specifically authorized 9 
 
 
by the head of the agency, no rulemaking shall commence nor be included on the plan without the 
approval of the agency’s Regulatory Policy Office...” 
Together, these provisions allow an agency head to control the agenda of an agency, but in 
the absence of an action by the agency head to initiate a regulation, they empower the RPO to do so. 
 These provisions do not allow the RPO to remove a regulation from the priority list adopted by the 
agency head, and thus do not represent a usurpation of the agency head’s authority.  Instead, they 
create a second path by which new regulations may be initiated, unless such new actions are 
explicitly cancelled by the agency head.  This path potentially could increase the number of 
regulations considered.  Some agencies are very large and have many responsibilities, so perhaps 
some agency heads may not be able to make considered decisions about regulatory priorities in a 
timely fashion.  Of course, we do not know if this is the case, for, once again, the Bush 
Administration provided no detailed explanation of the rationale for these changes.  But if any 
President has experienced difficulty in getting agencies to submit timely regulatory plans or to begin 
the process of  developing important new regulations, and if there is a good structural explanation 
for these delays, then the new provisions ought to expedite matters. 
The requirement that the RPO be a presidential appointee is a natural consequence of the 
elevated policy initiation authority that has been granted to this office.  An RPO who acts solely in 
an advisory capacity and who at most proposes an action agenda that then must be “approved 
personally” by the agency head, appropriately can be a senior civil servant.  But an RPO with 
substantial policy responsibility should be a political appointee – just as the agency head is a 
political appointee and in the past had sole authority to establish regulatory priorities.  Together, 
these two changes do not dramatically increase the politicization of regulatory processes because 
they retain the practice of giving agenda authority only to political appointees and preserve the 




EO 13422 mentions formal rule-making twice.  Section 6(a)(1) is amended to include a new 
sentence that states that an agency may “consider” using formal rule-making, but requiring 
consultation with OIRA and a comment period of sixty days on whether to proceed.  In addition, 10 
 
 
according to the new Section 3(h)(2)(A), guidance documents that are issued in connection with 
regulations that are adopted through formal rule-making are exempted from being classified as 
significant and so subject to mandatory benefit-cost analysis. 
These provisions certainly are something of a puzzle.  Agencies already have the discretion 
to adopt formal rule-making, so the new Section 6(a)(1) adds nothing to an agency’s authority or 
discretion, although agencies rarely exercise that option because of the complexity and procedural 
burdens on the agency for writing regulations in this way.  But “consultation with OIRA” is 
something new.  Does this mean that OIRA is contemplating a pro-active strategy to induce more 
formal rule-making procedures?  The exemption of guidance documents from OIRA review 
indicates that there is little danger that OIRA will embark on a campaign to bring back formal rule-
making.  A more plausible interpretation is that guidance documents on regulations emanating from 
formal rule-making were exempted from being classified as significant because of possible legal 
problems arising from an OIRA review (but not a formal public review) of these documents.  Once 
such an exemption was granted, OIRA may have wanted to play a role in a decision by an agency, 
however unlikely, to initiate formal rule-making.  If this reading of the purpose of these provisions is 
correct, then EO 13422 makes formal rule-making even less likely than before because OIRA 
support is not likely to be forthcoming even if an agency considers pursuing this path. 
 
Missing in Action Provisions 
 
For advocates of benefit-cost analysis, the most important aspect of EO 13422 is that it does 
not address any of the major problems with the implementation of mandatory benefit-cost analysis of 
significant regulations.  One will search in vain in the extensive scholarly literature on the merits of 
benefit-cost analysis for an extensive discussion of any of the issues that are addressed in EO 13422. 
 Indeed, the biggest puzzle about the reaction to EO 13422 is how either the advocates or the critics 
of benefit-cost analysis could regard the new EO as a significant change in the regulatory review 
process, given what they have written during the past three decades on this issue
.9  
                                                 
9.  The scholarly literature on the merits of mandatory benefit-cost analysis is extensive.  For a compendium of scholarly 
essays on the issue, see Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic and Philosophical 
Perspectives, University of Chicago Press, 2000.  For a comprehensive, sometimes critical but generally favorable 
analysis of the merits of benefit-cost analysis, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State:  The Future of Regulatory 11 
 
 
Many dogs do not bark in EO 13422.  A few that come to the mind of a long-time advocate 
of mandatory benefit-cost analysis are as follows.
10  First, neither regulatory agencies nor OIRA 
have adopted common values for important parameters of benefit-cost analysis, such as the value of 
a statistical life-year, adjustments (if any) for the quality of life, and the discount rate to be applied to 
future benefits and costs.  Second, many agencies have not developed a system for external expert 
review of either the scientific basis or the applications of the principles of economic analysis in their 
benefit-cost analyses.  Third, agency benefit-cost analyses use estimates of key components of 
benefits and costs that are subject to substantial uncertainty, yet typically they do not include a 
sensitivity analysis to quantify the range of uncertainty in their ultimate estimates of net benefits.  
Fourth, agencies do not effectively analyze reasonable regulatory alternatives.  Section 1(a) of EO 
12866 states the agencies “should assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives.”  
Section 1(b)(8) states that agencies “shall identify and assess alternative forms of regulation.”  
Section 6(a)(3)(C)(iii) requires that agencies consider “potentially effective and reasonably feasible 
alternatives” to a proposed regulation.  Agencies rarely implement the best practice version of this 
requirement, which is to consider a small but significant increase and decrease in the stringency of 
the regulation they propose.  As a result, whether an agency’s proposed regulation plausibly is 
economically optimal cannot be determined from the information in the benefit-cost analysis even 
when the estimated net benefits are strongly positive.  Fifth, agencies do a poor job of reviewing 
existing regulations.  Section 5(a) of EO 12866 requires that an agency “periodically review its 
existing significant regulations to determine whether and such regulations should be modified or 
eliminated.”  As a practical matter, this requirement is largely ignored by both agencies and OIRA . 
                                                                                                                                                             
Protection, Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice, American Bar Association, 2002.  Among the more 
prominent criticisms are Lisa Heinzerling, “Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions,” Yale Law Journal Vol. 107, No. 7 
(May 1998), pp. 1981-2070, and Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, “Pricing the Priceless:  Cost-Benefit Analysis of 
Environmental Protection,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review Vol. 150, No. 5 (May 2002), pp.1553-84.  For an 
extensive reply to the critics of benefit-cost analysis, see Robert W. Hahn, In Defense of the Economic Analysis of 
Regulation, AEI-Brookings Joint Center on Regulation, 2005. 
10.  This list is taken from two reports by Kenneth Arrow, et al., “Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in 
Environmental, Health and Safety Regulation?” Science Vol. 272, No. 5259 (April 12, 1996), pp. 221-2, and Benefit-Cost 
Analysis in Environmental, Health and Safety Regulation: A Statement of Principles, AEI Press, 1996.  For examples of 
systematic mistakes in implementing benefit-cost analysis, see the series of reports by Robert W. Hahn and Robert E. 
Litan on the web site of the AEI-Brookings Joint Center on Regulation, the last of which is “An Analysis of the Tenth 




The effect of these shortcomings is that the quality of regulatory benefit-cost analysis is 
generally low, which undermines the effectiveness of regulation.  The failure is symmetrical:  many 
inefficient regulations are in force, and many effective proposed regulations have never been 
adopted.  Robert Hahn has estimated that the U.S. could save as many lives as are saved by current 
regulation at half the cost, or twice as many lives at the cost of existing regulations.
11  Moreover, the 
overall quality of benefit-cost analysis has not improved over time, plausibly because they do not 
attempt to learn from experience by reviewing prior studies.  Agencies tend to overestimate both the 
benefits and costs of regulations, most plausibly because they overestimate the extent of 
compliance.
12  EO 13422 does not address any of the problems of effective implementation of 




EO 13422 is not very important in the grand scheme of regulatory policy.  My interpretation 
of the amendments to EO 12866 is that they address no substantial unresolved controversies about 
regulatory review and that for the most part they should be viewed as housekeeping changes to the 
regulatory review process.  Only the provisions regarding guidance documents have the potential to 
have a substantial effect on regulatory outcomes, and even here the likely impact is small, pending 
further information about the frequency of guidance documents that pass the test for significance. 
A new administration in 2009, even one that favors substantially more stringent regulation 
than the Bush Administration, is not likely to make any significant changes to the regime of EO 
12866 as amended by EO 13422.   Notwithstanding the critics of benefit-cost analysis, the political 
popularity of OMB’s regulatory review procedures cuts across the political spectrum.  Just as the 
conservative Bush Administration saw no need to make fundamental changes to the regulatory 
review policies of the moderate Clinton Administration, so, too, a new Administration in 2009 is 
                                                 
11.  Robert W. Hahn, “Regulatory Reform: What Do the Government’s Numbers Tell Us?,” in Robert W. Hahn (editor), 
Risks, Costs and Lives Saved: Getting Better Results from Regulation, American Enterprise Institute, 1996. 
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unlikely to regard a dramatic change in these procedures as an urgent priority.  In a few years the 
uproar over EO 13422 is likely to be a forgotten footnote in the history of regulatory policy. 